The share of agricultural workers who migrate within the United States has fallen by approximately 60% since the late 1990s. To explain this decline in the migration rate, we estimate annual migration-choice models using data from the National Agricultural Workers Survey for 1989-2009. On average over the last decade of the sample, one-third of the fall in the migration rate was due to changes in the demographic composition of the workforce, while twothirds was due to changes in coefficients ("structural" change). In some years, demographic changes were responsible for half of the overall change.
2006
) and the effects of industry restructuring such as those arising from the decline of manufacturing (Dennis and İşcan, 2007) .
The demographic composition of the agricultural work force has changed substantially since 1998. For example, the average worker today is older, more likely to be female, and more likely to be living with a spouse and children in the United States. We hypothesized that such workers might be less likely to migrate. We test various hypotheses and find that demographic changes played an important role in reducing the migration rate alongside underlying structural changes.
The first section discusses U.S. and Mexican institutional, governmental, and economic changes during our sample period that affected the demographic composition of the agricultural workforce and the migration of workers. The next section describes our data set, provides summary statistics, and plots trends in migration rates over time. The third section presents the estimates of the migration choice model for various years. The fourth section decomposes the drop in the migration rate into (1) changes due to shifts in the means of demographic variables, holding the model's structure constant, and (2) changes in the estimated coefficients, holding the means of the demographics constant. The fifth section shows how changes in the mean of individual demographic characteristics contributed to the decline in the migration rate. The last section summarizes our results.
Institutional, Governmental, and Economic Shocks
A number of institutional, governmental, and economic changes contributed to the reduction in the migration rate within the United States directly or through their effects on the demographic composition of the workforce. These shocks affected the supply and demand for labor in both Mexico and the United States. According to a survey of migrants, the cost of crossing the border with the help of smugglers, or "coyotes," rose substantially since mid-1990s (e.g. Cornelius, 2001; Gathmann, 2008) . Cornelius (2001) notes that increasing coyote costs are associated with decreases in the probability of returning to a country of origin and with increases in deaths along the border. Pena In addition, changes in U.S.-Mexican foreign relations and in Mexican public policy reduced incentives for its citizens to move to the United States in the second half of our sample period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) . Mexican farm laborers were less like to migrate to the United States because of increased economic growth in Mexico, rising productivity, and decreased birth rates (Boucher et al., 2007; Taylor, Charlton and Yúnez-Naude, 2012 Changes in the legal status of farm workers also affected the U.S. farm labor force. For example, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) conferred legal status on many previously unauthorized workers, which provided a path to a legal permanent residence status and citizenship. By so doing, IRCA reduced the share of unauthorized workers during the 1990s.
Over time, many of these workers left agriculture.
Together, these factors reduced the number of undocumented workers from Mexico in the United States. Martin (2013) reviews the history of immigration legislation and domestic enforcement and concludes that the e-verify program (which allows a firm to check a worker's legal status) had little impact during the period immediately after IRCA went into effect. In contrast, Kostandini, Mykerezi and Escalante (2014) show that after 2002, counties participating in the Department of Homeland Security's 287(g) enforcement program had fewer foreign-born workers, reduced labor usage, and experienced changes in cropping patterns among producers. In our empirical analysis, we investigate whether the willingness of a worker to migrate within the United States depends crucially on legal status.
A variety of other structural factors also affected the supply and demand for U.S. farm labor. In recent years, increased consumer demand for fresh fruits and vegetables and expanded exports of agricultural commodities led to greater production of labor-intensive crops (Martin, 2011) . Agricultural producers have responded to higher labor costs by improving productivity through increased mechanization and more efficient cultivation practices (Martin, 2011; Martin and Calvin, 2010) . These changes, by altering the value of the marginal products of labor across areas, affected the incentives to migrate within the United States. 4 Ideally, we would like to model and test the effects of each of these various shocks.
However, the number of institutional and policy changes are large relative to the number of years in our data set, 1989 to 2009. Thus, it is not feasible to test and model these shocks individually.
Rather, we estimate a migration model for each of the large, annual cross sections, and allow the coefficients in each year to change, so as to reflect the structural change over time stemming from all these individual shocks.
Data
We use data from the National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS), which is a nationally representative cross-sectional dataset of workers employed in seasonal crops. The NAWS collects basic demographic characteristics, legal status, education, family size and composition, wage, and working conditions in farm jobs from a sample of farmworkers in several cycles each year.
The NAWS samples by worksites rather than residences to overcome the difficulty of reaching migrant and seasonal farm workers. In contrast, the other major data source, the Current Population Survey, samples by standard residences and hence under samples agricultural workers and particularly migrants, who often live in nonstandard residences (Gabbard, Mines and Perloff, 1991) . To have a representative sample, the NAWS varies the number of interviews conducted in a season in proportion to the level of agricultural activity at that time of the year.
Spring, summer, and autumn survey cycles begin in February, June, and October and last approximately 12 weeks each. We study whether these agricultural workers migrated to their current job. By the nature of our data, we can tell if the worker entered agriculture from a non-agricultural sector, but we cannot examine whether a current worker will "migrate" in the future by exiting agriculture (cf, Barkley, 1990; Perloff, 1991) . Migrants (column 2) and non-migrants (column 3) have substantially different demographic characteristics. Compared to non-migrants, migrants are more likely to be male, Hispanic, unauthorized to work in the United States, and to work for a third-party farm labor Approximately 90 county clusters are selected using probabilities proportional to the size (PPS) of the seasonal agricultural payroll. The number of interviews within each season, region, and county are proportional to the amounts of agricultural activity at that time and location. Within each county cluster, the NAWS selects counties using the PPS of the seasonal agricultural payroll. Next, the NAWS randomly samples farm sites from a list of all farm employers located in the counties. The NAWS contacts the selected farm employers to obtain permission to interview the farm workers. Interviewers randomly sample workers employed by those farm employers and interview them outside of work hours at a location chosen by the worker (e.g., at the place of work, the worker's home, or another location).
Summary Statistics
contractor rather than directly for a grower. They earned less income the previous year, are younger, have less farm experience. They are less likely to speak English, live with a spouse or children in the United States, and own (or be in the process of buying) a house or motor vehicle in the United States. Table 1 Subpanel 2A shows how the proportion varies by legal status over time: citizens, legal permanent residents, and unauthorized workers. On average over the entire period, 18% of citizens migrate compared to 39% for legal permanent residents, 60% for those with other work authorization, and 48% for those who are unauthorized.
5 Thus, a higher share of unauthorized and other authorized workers migrated than did citizens and legal permanent residents in the sample overall. 6 The figure illustrates how the migration rates for authorized (inclusive of citizens, legal permanent residents, and those with other work authorization) versus unauthorized workers both fall over the last decade of our sample.
Subpanel 2B presents the proportion of migrants by geographic migration patterns.
Traditional networks of migrants follow typical U.S. harvest patterns by starting in the south and moving north as the season progresses. 7 The NAWS classifies workers into three north-south streams based on their work location at the time of interview and therefore includes both workers who follow-the-crop and those who work in a single location. As the figure shows, migration rates were generally higher for Eastern and Midwestern stream workers than for Western stream workers. The migration rate declines over time for all streams.
Subpanel 2C shows that workers younger than 35 are slightly more likely to migrate than are older workers. Again, both groups show a decline in the rate of migration in the recent period.
These results also hold for other demographic variables that are correlated with age, such as education and experience levels.
Our definition of a migrant includes both of the NAWS's sub-categories of migrants:
follow-the-crop migrants and shuttle migrants. Follow-the-crop migrants are workers who move between U.S. farms as the agricultural season progresses. Shuttle migrants move between their homes (either in the United States or abroad) and a single distant work site. 8 Figure 3 shows how the share of farmworkers who follow-the-crop or are shuttle migrants varies over time. The migration rate for both groups fell over our sample period. After the first year of the sample, the share of shuttle migrants exceeds that of follow-the-crop migrants. Analyzing these types of migrants separately produces results similar to those reported for the combined group in the following sections.
8
The NAWS defines a follow the crop migrant as a worker having two U.S. farm jobs greater than 75 miles apart. A shuttle migrant travels at least 75 miles from a home base to a single agricultural worksite. Shuttle migrants include domestic migrants as well as international migrants who are not border commuters. Foreign-born newcomers are classified as migrants because they migrated across a border to obtain farm work in the United States even though they have not worked in U.S. agriculture long enough to present a cyclical pattern. Careful examination does not reveal any changes in the construction of the migrant variable over this period or the administration of the survey.
Migration Model
To estimate a migration model, we can use any of the standard binary choice models: logit, probit, and the linear probability model. Because the share of workers who migrate lies between a quarter and a half in most years, all three methods produce nearly identical results in terms of the marginal effects of individual variables, their ability to predict, and our other analyses. For presentational simplicity, we use the linear probability model.
9
We estimate separate migration models for each year of the sample. We did so because the coefficients are not constant over time. 10 We tested and rejected that the intercept and slope coefficients are constant across various time-period aggregations such as the two halves of the sample and each pair of successive years.
We examine how the probability of migrating varies with three groups of demographic variables: individual characteristics, family attributes and assets, and employment experiences.
11
Our individual demographic variables include age; years of school; a dummy for female; dummies for Hispanic, African American, and American Indian (the base group is white nonHispanic); dummies for legal permanent resident, unauthorized worker, and other authorized worker (the base group is citizen worker); and a dummy for whether the individual speaks at least some English.
Family characteristics include whether the worker is married, lives with a spouse in the United States, and lives with at least one child under 18 years of age. Family wealth and income variables include whether the individual owns or is buying a house in the United States; whether the individual owns or is buying a car or truck in the United States; and the worker's selfreported real personal income in the previous year (in 2011 dollars based on the Consumer Price Index). We used lagged personal income to avoid endogeneity.
Our employment variables include years of farm experience; a dummy if the employee performs semi-skilled or skilled work or supervises others; and a dummy if the worker was hired by a farm labor contractor (rather than a grower). 12 Our dependent variable equals one if the worker is a migrant and zero otherwise. Table 2 shows estimates of our model using data from 1989, the first year of our sample (column 1); for 1998, the end of our stable period (column 2); and for 2009, the last year of the data (column 3). The table reports robust standard errors in parentheses.
Based on hypotheses tests, we can reject the hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are identical in any two years. We can similarly reject any of the other aggregations over time.
The following discussion focuses on the estimates from the 1998 model (column 2 The probability of migrating falls with lagged personal income. We expected this result because the main purpose of migrating for these workers is to earn a higher income. Workers hired by farm labor contractors are 15 percentage points more likely to migrate than are those who are directly hired by farmers. Farm labor contractors provide labor to many farms and may provide transportation to distant jobs. In contrast, a worker hired by a farmer is likely to work at a single location.
We had expected that legal status of workers would play an important role; however, no clear pattern emerged. In the 1989 and 1998 regressions, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on unauthorized workers are zero (the base group is citizens in the regressions). The coefficient is negative and statistically significant in the 2009 regression. We see the same pattern for other-authorized workers. In contrast, legal permanent residents were 14 percentage points more likely to migrate in 1998, but the difference was not statistically significant in the other two years.
Migration Change Decomposition
The change in the annual average migration rate over time is due to (1) changes in the estimated coefficients, such as from institutional, governmental, and economic shocks, and (2) changes in the means of the demographic variables. We decompose the change in the migration rate into these two effects, which we call the coefficient and demographic effects. In the following, we compare the change in the migration rate between 1998 (the last year of the stable period) and each year thereafter. (We get similar results if we compare the migration rate in any given year before 1998 or 2001 to these later years.)
Our approach, which uses separate regression equations for each year, differs from the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, which typically uses a single regression (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Elder, Goddeeris and Haider, 2010) . We use the regression equation for each year t to calculate the fitted migration rate
where is a vector of mean values of the explanatory variables over the N survey respondents in year t, and � and � are estimated intercept and coefficients of the explanatory variables.
To examine the change in the migration rate from year t to the following year, t+1, we subtract � = � + � from � +1 = � +1 + � +1 +1 and rearrange the terms:
Similarly, for changes between a pair of successive years t+n-1 to t+n, we have Thus, the total change in the migration rate is the sum of the coefficient effect-which allows the coefficients to change while holding the means of the demographic variables constant-and the demographic effect-which allows the demographic means to change while holding the coefficients constant.
13 Table 3 shows that the total change in the migration rate from 1998 to a given later year, � + − � , equals the sum of the changes due to coefficients alone and due to demographics alone. The first column of Table 3 We do not separately report these results because they are qualitatively the same and fairly close quantitatively.
14 sum of these two effects: 33 = 18.2 + 14.8. For this example, 44.9% (= 14.8/33) of the total change is attributable to changes in demographics and 55.1% to changes in coefficients.
On average across the years, a little more than one third of the drop in the migration rate since 1998 was due to changes in the demographic composition of the work force. The remaining roughly two-thirds of the drop in the migration rate was due to changes in coefficients, such as from institutional, governmental, and economic shocks.
Effects of Individual Demographic Variables
We can also calculate the contribution of each demographic variable to the decline in the migration rate from 1998 to 2009. The migration rate for the average worker in 1998 was 52.8%.
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the change in the average value of a given demographic variable between 1998 and 2009. Column 2 shows the resulting effect of each demographic variable on the migration rate. The contribution of k th demographic attribute is calculated as
. If the relevant coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero, the term in Column 2 is bold.
Changes in the shares of legal permanent residents, Hispanics, married workers, workers living with a spouse, workers living with children, workers employed by a farm labor contractor, and personal income were associated with particularly large changes in the probability of migrating.
The last two rows of the first column in Table 4 show that the combined effect of all the demographic variables caused the probability of migrating to fall by nearly 15 percentage points.
Because the total decrease in the migration rate from 1998 to 2009 is 33 percentage points, 45%
of the total is due to demographic changes, as the 2009 row in 
Conclusions
According to the National Agricultural Workers Survey, the migration rate of hired agricultural workers within the United States was relatively constant from 1989 to 1998, but then plummeted 30 percentage points from 53% in 1998 to 23% in 2009. Explaining this drop in the migration rate is crucial because U.S. farmers in seasonal agriculture depend on the availability of shortterm workers to meet their peak labor demands during planting and harvesting seasons.
To explain this drop, we estimate a migration choice model for each year from 1989 through 2009. In general, the specification of our migration equation is similar to those in the previous literature on agricultural workers migration. We find that workers who have higher incomes and who live with a spouse and children in the United States are less likely to migrate.
In contrast, married workers who are not living with their families are more likely to migrateperhaps so that they can send more money home to their families in Mexico or other countries of origin. All else the same, Hispanic workers are more likely to migrate.
Using those estimates, we decompose the drop in the migration rate into two effects. First, on average, roughly two-thirds of the decline in the migration is due to changes in the coefficients ("structural" changes), holding the demographic composition of the labor force constant. These changes reflect a variety of institutional, governmental, and economic changes in the United States and Mexico. 16 Second, on average, the remaining one third of the decline in the migration rate is due to a shift in the demographic composition of the U.S. hired agricultural labor force holding the structural model constant. In some years, the demographic changes were responsible for roughly half the total change.
New immigration laws and more vigorous enforcement in recent years-especially after 9/11-as well as changes to the incentives to migrate from Mexico due to international policy and economic changes presumably were largely responsible for most of the changes in the demographic composition of the workforce. These shocks reduced the influx of new migrants, who are predominantly young and single, into the agricultural labor force.
As a result, between 1998 and 2009, the agricultural workforce became older, more experienced in farm work, less likely to be employed by a farm labor contractor, and less likely to be Hispanic. Workers also were more likely to be married and living with immediate family members such as a spouse and children in the United States, and more likely to have a home or a car in the United States.
Because migrants play a crucial role in many labor-intensive, seasonal, agricultural crops, the dramatic decrease in migration rates and the total number of migrants significantly reduced the ability of agricultural labor market to respond to seasonal shifts in demand during the year. If the current downward trend of migration continues and no alternative supply (such as from a revised H-2A program or earned legalization program) becomes available, farmers will probably experience much greater difficulty finding workers during planting and harvesting seasons and may have to substantially raise wages. Indeed, according U.S. Department of Agriculture, between 1990 and 2009, the real wage of nonsupervisory hired farmworkers increased 20%.
Thus, lawmakers should pay particular attention to the adverse effect of immigration laws on agriculture.
Our results also directly address a major concern that granting legal status to unauthorized agricultural workers will reduce their willingness to migrate. We find that U.S.
citizens and legal permanent residents were more likely to migrate than unauthorized workers during the 1999-2008 period. Apparently, stricter border enforcement during this period made unauthorized workers less willing to migrate within the United States because they feared such a migration would raise the odds of being caught. These summary statistics are calculated using sampling weight for data from the National Agricultural Workers Surveys (NAWS) for 1989-2009, where observations with missing variables were dropped. a NAWS income information is categorical: it equals 1 if income < $500, 2 if $500 < income < $999, and so forth. We set income equal to the midpoint of the relevant interval. Calculations based on statistically significant coefficients are in bold.
The contribution of the k th demographic variable is � � + � � + +1 − � + �. The dependent variable equals one if the worker migrated and zero otherwise. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
